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1. Introduction 
This paper links the literature on dual-class stock unifications with that on index membership. The 
literature on why firms issue dual-class shares and why firms abolish them once they have been 
issued is as yet relatively sparse (Adams and Ferreira 2008). Although the former decision seems 
to be driven by the controlling shareholder’s desire to retain voting power while reducing cash-
flow risk (see e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985), little is known as to why firms make the latter 
decision. The few studies that investigate dual-class unifications (Maury and Pajuste 2011; 
Dittmann and Ulbricht 2008; Hauser and Lauterbach 2004; Lauterbach and Pajuste 2015; 
Lauterbach and Pajuste 2017) suggest that improving access to external financing is an important 
motive whereas the existence of private benefits of control is a deterrent.  
This paper extends this literature by studying a major reform of how German firms are selected for 
membership of the various stock market indices. In August 2000, Deutsche Börse announced new 
index weighting rules for its major stock indices. Under the old rules index membership was based 
on the firm’s aggregate market capitalization. The changes caused by the reform, which became 
effective in June 2002, were twofold. First, only the most liquid or largest class now forms the 
basis for selection into an index. Second, only the free float of that class is taken into account when 
determining index membership.    
As a consequence, firms with more than one class of shares outstanding included in a selection 
index faced the danger of losing their current index position or, worse even, faced the danger of 
dropping out of the index. For example, DAX index member SAP was set to lose massively. At 
the announcement of the new rules in August 2000 and assuming the new rules had been effective 
immediately, SAP’s weight in the DAX would have fallen by almost 40% from 9.51% to 5.64%. 
More generally, companies whose equity was split fairly equally between the two classes, i.e. the 
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non-voting shares and the voting shares, and with little free float were adversely affected. 
Conversely, those with their equity in mainly one class and a large free float ranked among the 
winners. 
Why should firms care about index membership and weight? As the mere gain or loss of 
membership does not provide any additional information on the firm’s fundamental value, any such 
change in membership should therefore be valuation neutral. However, several studies document 
that index inclusions cause positive whereas deletions cause negative abnormal returns.4 As to 
index weight, Kaul et al. (2000) find that a change in the index weighting rules of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSE), that redefined the weighting-relevant free float, caused valuation increases 
for those firms that experienced an increase in their index weight in the TSE 300 index. One 
important reason for these market reactions is changes in investor demand for the firm’s stock, in 
particular demand by index fund managers (see e.g., Shleifer 1986; Barberis et al. 2005, and 
Claessens and Yafeh 2013). Several other reasons, all of which have empirical support, have been 
advanced to explain these market reactions, including investor awareness (Merton 1987), price 
pressure (Harris and Gurel 1986), improved liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson 1986) and 
information signals about the firm’s prospects (Denis et al. 2003).  
We hypothesize that the regulatory changes that became effective in 2002 forced the large 
shareholders of firms with dual-class shares to reassess the benefits from index membership by 
weighing them against the foregone private benefits of control caused by the unification. Anecdotal 
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 Studies that examine the effect of index inclusions or deletions include Denis et al. (2003), Hrazdil and Scott (2009), 
Goetzmann and Garry (1986), Jain (1987), Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) and Chen et al. (2004). While there is a large 
body of literature on the US stock markets, there are only few empirical studies on the effects of index inclusion and 
deletion in the German market (see e.g., Gerke et al. 2001; Deininger et al. 2002). 
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evidence suggests that some firms conducted this reassessment well before the implementation of 
the new rules. For example, SAP unified its stock in 2001, i.e. one year before the implementation 
of the rules, justifying the move by its endeavor to keep its index weight.5  
The paper’s main contribution is to study the trade-off faced by large controlling shareholders 
between the benefits from a dual-class stock unification and the costs from losing voting power. 
We estimate the probability of conversion – conditional on different levels of reduction in index 
weight – for various levels of the hypothetical voting loss the controlling shareholder would 
experience upon conversion. We find that the large shareholder is more likely to accept a reduction 
in index weight, and hence less likely to unify the dual-class shares, the higher his hypothetical 
voting loss due to the conversion. This suggests that beyond a certain threshold of voting power 
the private benefits of control foregone by the large shareholder exceed his share of the benefits 
from unification. Similar to the wealth effects accruing to the holders of the non-voting stock that 
have been documented for German stock unifications before the reform (see e.g. Dittmann and 
Ulbricht 2007), we observe such wealth effects at the announcement of the regulatory change. 
Finally, and in line with anecdotal evidence, we find that the danger of dropping out of the index 
is an important reason for conversion. However, the opportunity to move up an index seems 
unrelated to unification decisions.  
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 During summer 2000, the CEO (i.e., the chairman of the management board), Hasso Plattner, denied that SAP was 
to convert its preference shares into ordinary shares: “We will keep the preference shares” (“Es wird weiter 
Vorzugsaktien geben”). A year later, Henning Kagermann (member of the management board of SAP) justified the 
decision to convert in the magazine Focus (June 7, 2001) as follows: “Thereby we avoid the risk of seeing SAP lose 
its position in the DAX index” (“Damit wird das Risiko einer Rückgewichtung der SAP-Aktie im Dax-Index 
vermieden”). 
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Our study is related to Dittmann and Ulbricht (2008), who study the timing and the announcement 
effects of German stock unifications for 1990 to 2001, a period during which the index rules 
remained the same. In contrast, we focus on an exogenous shock which forced the controlling 
shareholder to reconsider the benefits from maintaining dual-class shares in the light of the 
potential costs caused by a reduction in index weight.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on dual-class 
stock unifications. This is followed by a discussion of the institutional background before and after 
the regulatory change in Section 3. Section 4 describes the dataset and provides descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 explores the stock market’s reaction to the regulatory change and to the actual 
unifications. Section 6 reviews the motives behind the decision to unify a firm’s shares and 
develops several testable hypotheses. Section 7 presents the empirical analysis. Section 8 
concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Adams and Ferreira (2008) survey the empirical literature on disproportional ownership. They 
conclude that “few papers directly tackle the issue of the determinants of dual-class structures ... 
Consequently, we still know very little about this issue” (Adams and Ferreira 2008, p.62). Papers 
on the determinants of the decision to separate cash flow rights from voting rights include Lehn et 
al. (1990), Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) and Gompers et al. (2010). Lehn et al. (1990) investigate 
the choice between dual-class recapitalizations and going private transactions as means to 
consolidate corporate control. Both transactions mainly differ in the allocation of cash flow rights 
to the controlling shareholder. They find that firms with better growth opportunities are more likely 
to undergo a dual-class recapitalization, compared to firms going private, as they want to maintain 
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their access to the stock market. Amoako-Adu and Smith (2001) examine the determinants of dual-
class stock structures for Canadian initial public offerings (IPOs). They find that a large family 
stake before the IPO increases the probability of a dual-class share structure after the IPO. Finally, 
Gompers et al. (2010) find that US firms with greater private benefits of control are more likely to 
have a dual-class structure. 
There are even fewer papers that study dual-class stock unifications. Studies on US firms, such as 
Ang and Megginson (1989) and Kunz (2002), do not find evidence of significant shareholder 
wealth effects from unifications. In contrast, the only two published studies on Germany (Maury 
and Pajuste 2011 and Dittmann and Ulbricht 2008) find significant wealth effects. Dittmann and 
Ulbricht (2008) analyse 89 German firms with dual-class shares between 1990 and 2001 of which 
31 unify their stock. They document not only that dual-class stock unifications generate 
significantly positive shareholder wealth effects, but also that the percentage of voting shares held 
by the largest shareholder, as well as the hypothetical loss of that shareholder’s voting power after 
the conversion, reduces the likelihood of unifying the shares. They also find that a lack of dividend 
payments in the recent past increases the likelihood of conversion, suggesting that firms are more 
likely to unify their stock if they are financially constrained. 
Maury and Pajuste (2011) explore the probability of stock unification in a cross-country study of 
seven Western European countries covering 493 non-financial dual-class stock firms from 1996 to 
2002.6 They confirm Dittmann and Ulbricht’s (2008) results of both the fraction of voting shares 
of the largest shareholder and the wedge between his control and ownership rights reducing the 
                                                     
6
 Their regression results are based on a reduced sample of 382 firms. 
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likelihood of a stock unification. In contrast, their proxies for financing needs, such as the market-
to-book ratio and proceeds from new equity issues, increase that likelihood. 
Lauterbach and Yafeh (2011) examine 80 Israeli stock unifications during the 1990s, paying special 
attention to post-unification changes in voting power and control structure. They not only find that 
controlling shareholders offset the dilution of voting power by adjusting their shareholdings before 
and after the unification, but also that typically their identity does not change as a result of the 
unification process. 
Our study extends this literature in a major way by analysing the decision to unify dual-class shares 
in a situation, i.e. the 2002 change to the listing rules of Deutsche Börse, where the status quo is 
associated with substantial costs in terms of reduced index weight, forcing the controlling 
shareholder to reassess the benefits from keeping voting power versus the costs of reduced index 
weight. 
Our study differs from Hauser and Lauterbach (2004) and Bigelli et al. (2011). Hauser and 
Lauterbach (2004) analyse 84 Israeli unifications. They find that the compensation paid to the large 
shareholder for the loss in voting rights depends on three factors. First, the compensation increases 
with the large shareholder’s percentage of votes. Second, it decreases if there is institutional 
ownership. Third, it is higher for family-controlled firms. In addition, the large shareholder is 
compensated for the loss of votes even if this loss does not reduce his percentage of the votes below 
a majority. Bigelli et al. (2011) study 47 dual-class unifications by 42 Italian firms between 1974 
and 2008. They observe that the market response to the unification is positive for non-voting shares. 
They also find that the price reaction for the shares is only significantly negative if the controlling 
shareholder held non-voting shares prior to the announcement. For this subsample of firms, they 
also show that the likelihood of receiving compensation for the loss of their voting privileges is 
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significantly lower, providing a possible explanation for the negative market responses. They 
suggest that owning non-voting shares during unifications allows controlling shareholders to 
benefit from the associated increases in share prices. 
Finally, our study also differs from Lauterbach and Pajuste (2017), who study the impact of media 
pressure on the likelihood of stock unifications in seven Western European countries from 1996 to 
2002. They find that the likelihood increases with media pressure and that seven years after the 
unification the decrease in the percentage of votes held by the controlling shareholder is greater for 
firms under intense media pressure. In our study, we find another motive for firms to unify their 
stock: a reduction in the firm’s index weight. 
3. Institutional Background 
This section describes the characteristics of German dual-class shares, more specifically non-voting 
shares, as well as the various selection indices. It also discusses the 2002 changes to the index 
selection rules in more detail. The German Stock Corporation Act (§139 AktG) allows firms to 
issue non-voting shares, also called preference shares7 for up to 50% of their total book value of 
equity.8 In contrast to voting shares which confer one vote each, these shares do not confer any 
voting rights. However, they confer the right to a guaranteed dividend amount, which is normally 
a percentage of their face value. This guaranteed dividend amount must be paid out of profits before 
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 Since 1998 the issuance of multiple-voting shares has been prohibited by German law (see KonTraG (“Gesetz zur 
Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich”).  Existing multiple-voting shares lost their validity on May 30, 
2003, unless approved by the shareholders’ meeting (§5 EGAktG). 
8
 The average (median) firm, included in a selection index during our sample period, has 33.77% (38.80%) of its 
total book value of equity in the form of non-voting preference shares. 
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any dividend can be paid to the holders of the voting shares. If the remaining earnings are sufficient, 
the dividend amount paid to the holders of the non-voting shares is then also distributed to the 
voting shareholders. Finally, what remains is distributed equally among all shareholders. If the firm 
cannot afford the guaranteed dividend amount, the latter is carried over to the next year. If it has 
been carried over twice, then the non-voting shares confer voting rights until the firm has paid these 
arrears. Finally, non-voting shares are also senior to voting shares in case of liquidation and 
bankruptcy. 
Deutsche Börse distinguishes between two types of indices: all-share indices and selection indices. 
While the former include all the shares in a given market segment, the latter comprise only a limited 
number of shares. We focus on the latter. The selection indices are hierarchically structured: The 
DAX index tracks the largest and most actively traded firms on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (blue 
chip stocks), followed by the MDAX (the 50 mid cap stocks) and SDAX (the 50 small cap stocks) 
indices. The TecDAX index ranks below the DAX and covers the 30 largest and most liquid 
technology stocks.9 To be included in one of the selection indices, companies must fulfill certain 
criteria. Two of the criteria for inclusion are that the shares trade on the Prime Standard segment10 
of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and that they are continuously traded on Xetra, an electronic 
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 TecDAX started in March 2003 and replaced Nemax50 as the reference index for technology shares. Hence, we 
base ourselves on the latter for the pre-2003 period but the former for the remainder of the period of study. 
10
 This criterion came into effect on January 1, 2003. Companies which are part of the Prime Standard segment have 
to fulfill the highest transparency requirements in the EU. They have to publish company reports on a quarterly basis 
in both German and English, follow international accounting standards (IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP), release a financial 
calendar, conduct at least one analyst conference per year and publish their ad-hoc disclosures in both German and 
English.  
10 
 
trading platform. For all those firms that either are already included in a selection index or qualify 
for inclusion Deutsche Börse publishes monthly so-called “equity index rankings”. The key criteria 
for these rankings are order-book turnover at Frankfurt and market capitalization. The rankings 
form the basis at the quarterly meetings of the Working Committee for Equity Indices for the 
decision on whether a particular firm is to be included in or excluded from one of Deutsche Börse’s 
selection indices. Table 1 shows the list of selection indices and reports the definition and 
composition of each selection index. 
Table 1: Selection Indices 
Selection index No. of 
members 
Description 
DAX 30 It tracks the 30 largest and most actively traded firms at the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange (blue chip stocks) and covers roughly 80 percent of the 
tradable equity in Germany.   
TecDAX 30 It ranks below the DAX and provides coverage for the 30 largest and most 
liquid technology sector (“new economy”) stocks. It started in March 2003 
and replaced the Nemax50 as the reference index for high tech firms. 
MDAX 50 It ranks below the DAX and covers the 50 mid-cap stocks from mature 
(“old economy”) sectors. It was downsized from 70 to 50 companies on 
March 24th, 2003 
SDAX 50 It ranks below the MDAX and comprises the next 50 stocks from the 
mature (“old economy”) sectors. It was downsized from 100 to 50 
companies on June 24th, 2002. 
Nemax50 50 It was the stock market index of the Neuer Markt and represented the 50 
largest stocks from the technology (“new economy”) sector. It was 
discontinued on December 31, 2004, as a result of the dissolution of the 
Neuer Markt. 
 
Notes: Table 1 provides an overview of the selection indices of Deutsche Börse. The rank of firms 
within a given index is based on the market capitalization of the free float and stock turnover.  
 
In August 2000, Deutsche Börse announced changes to the selection criteria for all its selection 
indices, which became effective in June 2002. Until then, the main criterion for the inclusion in a 
selection index was the firm’s market capitalization which was computed by multiplying the 
number of all its issued shares, i.e. the sum of non-voting shares and voting shares for dual-class 
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firms, multiplied by the price of the more liquid class.11 Since the change, only the free float of the 
most highly capitalized or most liquid class of shares, i.e. either the non-voting stock or the voting 
stock, has formed the basis for the determination of the firm’s market capitalization.  
There are two main ways of unifying dual-class shares. First, the non-voting shares may be 
converted into ordinary voting shares by amending the firm’s articles of association. This change 
requires the approval of the general shareholders’ meeting and requires a special resolution to be 
passed by the bearers of the non-voting shares in a separate meeting. Second, the company may 
repurchase the non-voting shares and then subsequently replace them by issuing new voting shares. 
In this case, the non-voting shares must be cancelled out. This requires the court’s authorization as 
it is a reduction of the firm’s equity capital. It can be done only by proving that the capital is 
adequate, otherwise creditors are harmed and may sue the directors.12  
4. Dataset and Descriptive Statistics 
We start with all the 91 German companies with dual-class shares that are listed on Deutsche 
Börse’s CDAX segment13 between January 2000 and December 2008. The period of study begins 
in 2000 to capture the run-up prior to the change in the rules. The official announcement of the 
regulatory change was made on August 8, 2000, but since it was published after the market’s close, 
the effective event date is August 9.  
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 The liquidity of a stock is measured by its turnover on the exchange. 
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 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
13
 The CDAX tracks all German companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in the Prime and General 
Standard. It provides a performance measure of the overall German equity market. 
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Of the 91 firms, 30 convert their non-voting shares into voting shares at some point during the 
period of study. We exclude one firm that makes the decision to convert in 1999, another one that 
converts its non-voting shares immediately following its IPO and four firms with insufficient data. 
We arrive at a final sample of 85 firms, 25 of which abolish their dual-class shares during the period 
of study. Our sample size is comparable to that in Dittmann and Ulbricht (2008): they have 89 
firms, for 1990-2001, of which 31 convert their non-voting shares. Nineteen of our sample firms, 
or 35% of the subsample of the 54 firms that have been listed in one of the selection indices of 
Deutsche Börse, decide to convert, compared to only 6 firms or 19% of the remaining firms. The 
remainder of the analysis focuses on those 54 firms that are included in a selection index as these 
are the firms that are affected by the change in rules, generating 229 firm-year observations.14 
The aforementioned changes in index weighting rules were introduced in June 2002. However, the 
intention to change the rules had already been the subject of speculation before that date while the 
changes were officially announced in August 2000. Well aware of the impending changes, many 
firms may have chosen to convert prior to the actual implementation of the new selection rules. 
 
Table 2: Announcement dates of stock unifications between 2000 and 2008 
Company Name Date of  
Announcement 
Relative Index 
Position in the 
Month of the 
Announcement 
Index 
AdCapital AG 06.04.2001 0.64 SDAX 
Escada AG 17.07.2002 0.04 MDAX 
Fielmann AG 04.05.2000 0.09 MDAX 
Fresenius Medical Care AG 04.05.2005 0.00 DAX 
Heidelberg Cement 15.03.2002 0.81 MDAX 
Herlitz AG 14.04.2000 0.12 SDAX 
Hypo Real Estate Holding AG 12.04.2005 0.96 MDAX 
Koenig und Bauer AG 19.04.2001 0.90 SDAX 
                                                     
14
 If a company drops out of a selection index over time, then it is no longer part of our sample. 
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Krones AG 25.03.2004 0.18 MDAX 
Man AG  21.03.2002 0.00 DAX 
Marschollek, Lautenschläger und Partner AG 30.09.2000 1.00 MDAX 
Metro AG  22.05.2000 0.02 EuroStoxx50 
Rheinmetall AG 21.03.2005 0.45 MDAX 
Rhoen-Klinikum AG 27.04.2005 0.20 MDAX 
SAP AG 28.02.2001 0.66 DAX 
Stada Arzneimittel AG 24.04.2001y 0.98 SDAX 
Stada Arzneimittel AG 2003z   
Südzucker AG 07.06.2001 0.49 MDAX 
Gerry Weber AG 13.04.2000 0.37 SDAX 
 
Notes: The dates for the announcements are gathered from the website of the German Association for Ad-Hoc 
Announcements (“Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität” (DGAP), www.dgap.de), company websites and 
newspaper articles. The relative index position is calculated as follows. MLP is the firm with the highest index  
weight in its respective index (under the new rules), hence it gets a "1". Ad Capital gets a 0.64 as 64% percent of the 
other firms in the index have a lower index weight compared to Ad Capital. y This relates to a partial conversion. z 
We failed to identify the correct announcement date. Therefore, we decided to exclude this case from the event study 
analysis. 
 
Table 2 shows that the majority of unifications occurred indeed between 2000 and 2002.15 Hence, 
we simulate the decision problem the firm and its controlling shareholder was facing by 
recalculating index weightings on a monthly basis prior to the implementation of the changes, but 
based on the new rules. In other words, instead of using actual historical data, we calculate the 
market capitalization of the free float of the larger or more liquid class of shares and use this 
information to determine the weighting of the firm in its current index under the new rules.16 These 
calculations illustrate the firm’s situation had the new rules already been implemented. In contrast, 
the weightings used in the paper subsequent to the change in rules are the actual weightings of 
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 In addition, Table 2 provides the relative position for each firm in the index at the time of the dual-class unification 
announcement and its respective index membership. 
16
 More specifically, we computed the hypothetical free-float market capitalization for all companies included in an 
index and this was done for all single- and dual-class firms (for the latter, the free-float market capitalization was 
calculated only for the most liquid stock class). 
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Deutsche Börse. In addition, we calculate the hypothetical index weight if the non-voting shares 
were converted into voting shares.17 The opportunity costs in terms of index weight of retaining 
the dual-class shares are then defined as the difference between the new hypothetical index weight 
and the actual weight.18 We refer to this difference as the index “weight penalty”. In addition, we 
determine for each firm the quantile to which the firm belongs within its selection index. The 
quantile is based on the firm’s rank or position within its index in terms of its index weighting. If 
the median monthly rank for a firm within a given year is in the 5% quantile, we consider it to be 
in danger of dropping out of its index during that year. If its median rank for a year is in the 95% 
quantile, we consider that the firm has the chance to move up one index during that year.  
Data on ownership and control as well as the numbers of voting and non-voting shares outstanding 
are collected from the Hoppenstedt annual stock guides.19 We determine ultimate control following 
the procedure used by Correia da Silva et al. (2004) and Goergen et al. (2005). Their definition of 
a controlling shareholder is the largest shareholder with a stake of at least 25% of the voting rights. 
If there is no shareholder holding at least 25% of the votes, the company is considered to be widely 
held. This procedure accounts for control that is held indirectly via chains of control or pyramids 
of ownership. The ultimate controlling shareholder is situated at the first tier if it is a bank, 
insurance company, the German state, a foreign investor, or a family/individual. In all other cases, 
the ultimate controlling shareholder is said to be at a higher tier and this tier is reached once the 
                                                     
17
 In case there was only one class of stocks traded on the market, the number of all voting and non-voting stock is 
multiplied by the share price of the most liquid stock. 
18
 Before the implementation of the new rules, the “actual weight” is the estimated weight. 
19
 For the few cases where the large shareholder’s ownership of preference shares outstanding was not disclosed, we 
contact the firm’s investor relations department. 
15 
 
tier above does not include any controlling shareholder or the controlling shareholder at that tier is 
a widely held bank or insurance company, the German state, a foreign investor, or a 
family/individual. In order to determine the control of intermediate companies that are not listed 
on a stock exchange, we consult Commerzbank’s “Wer gehört zu wem” handbooks. As in Dittman 
and Ulbricht (2007), we calculate the hypothetical loss of the controlling shareholder’s voting 
power if the non-voting shares were to be converted into voting shares. It is defined as the 
difference between the percentage of voting shares and the percentage of non-voting shares held 
by the controlling shareholder, multiplied by the proportion of non-voting shares. All remaining 
data are collected from Thomson Financial. Table 3 reports the definitions of all the variables used 
in this paper.  
 
Table 3: Definition of the variables 
Variable Definition 
Conversion Dummy variable that is set to one for the year in which the firm decides to unify its shares, 
and zero otherwise. Observations for the years after the year of the conversion are excluded 
from the regression analysis. 
Vote loss The difference between the percentage of voting shares and non-voting shares held by the 
controlling shareholder, multiplied by the proportion of non-voting shares. 
Weight penalty The amount of index weight foregone by retaining the dual-class share structure. It is 
defined as the difference between the hypothetical index weight in percent if the non-voting 
shares were converted into voting shares and the actual weight in percent; e.g. if the 
hypothetical index weight is 0.5% and the actual weight is 0.1%, this corresponds to an 
increase of 0.4 percentage points in weight penalty. This difference is calculated on a 
monthly basis. Weight penalty is measured as the median value of these differences over 
the 12 months in the preceding calendar year. 
Danger 
 
Dummy variable that is set to one if the median of the firm’s quantile rank in its index in 
the year before the unification is in the 5% quantile, and zero otherwise. This dummy 
measures the potential for the firm to drop by one index. 
Chance Dummy variable that is set to one if the median of the firm’s quantile rank in its index in 
the year before the unification takes is in the 95% quantile, and zero otherwise. This dummy 
measures the potential for the firm to move up one index. 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets  
Tangibility Net property, plant & equipment divided by the firm’s total assets in (t-1). 
Financial investor Dummy variable that is set to one if the largest shareholder holding more than 25% of the 
votes is a financial institution (i.e. bank or insurance company). 
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Panel A of Table 4 reports the percentage of firm-year observations where the (ultimate) largest 
shareholder’s stake exceeds the 25% voting threshold adopted by this study. For the sake of 
comparison, we also report the equivalent percentage for the higher threshold of 50%. Panel B 
reports the summary statistics for the voting rights, the cash flow rights, the hypothesized vote loss 
of the largest shareholder, the hypothesized weight penalty, total assets and the tangibility (defined 
as net property, plant & equipment divided by the firm’s total assets). Finally, Panel C reports 
summary statistics for the firms that decide to unify and those that keep their dual-class structure. 
Panel A suggests that voting power, as measured by the voting rights of the controlling shareholder, 
is highly concentrated: for 88.2% of all the firm-year observations voting power exceeds 25% of 
the votes and for 71.6% voting power exceeds 50% of the votes. Existing studies also document a 
high concentration of voting power in listed German companies. For example, Becht and Böhmer 
(2003) find that more than 82% of firms have a large shareholder holding at least 25% of the votes 
for their sample of 372 companies in 1996. Likewise, for a sample of 171 companies in 1990 Franks 
and Mayer (2001) report that 85.4% of firms have a single large shareholder with more than 25% 
of the votes and 57.3% of firms have a majority shareholder.  
Panel B suggests that, while the largest shareholder owns roughly 65% of the votes, he only owns 
41% of the cash flow rights. On average, the hypothesized vote loss is 22% and the weight penalty 
amounts to 0.33%. For the average firm a change in 0.33 percentage points corresponds to a 36% 
change in the relative weight. Before we proceed with the discussion of the reasons that may lead 
firms to unify their shares, we explore the stock market reaction to the change in rules. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Percentage and number of firm-year observations where the largest shareholder holds at least 25% and 
50% of the votes, respectively 
   
Minimum stake held by largest shareholder %  # 
   
25%  88.2  202 
50%  71.6  164 
   
Panel B. Summary statistics  
    
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
Voting rights of largest shareholder [%] 64.7 65.6 28.6 0 100 
Preference shares held by the largest 
shareholder [%] 
5.46 0 16.12 0 100 
Cash flow rights of largest shareholder [%] 40.5 41.8 20.5 0 97.8 
Vote loss [%] 22.3 23.2 16.1 0 50.0 
Weight penalty [%] 0.33 0.12 0.57 0 5.91 
Financial investor [%] 6.55     
Total assets (m euros) 31300 1500 102000 72.6 697000 
Tangibility 0.33 0.28 0.21 0.00 1.56 
      
Panel C. Summary statistics of firms that decide to unify and those that decide to keep the dual-class share structure 
   
 DC-Unification No DC-Unification 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
Voting rights of largest shareholder [%] 46.69 50.76 66.41 68.26 
Preference shares held by the largest 
shareholder [%] 
2.45 0 5.73 0 
Cash flow rights of largest shareholder [%] 28.12 26.55 41.60 42.79 
Vote loss [%] 13.64 10.76 23.06 23.45 
Weight penalty [%] 0.76 0.40 0.29 0.11 
Financial investor [%] 10.53  6.19  
Total assets (m euros) 11100 1150 33100 1590 
Tangibility 0.25 0.21 0.34 0.30 
     
 
Notes: The variables are defined as in Table 3. The table is based on the 229 firm-year observations for all the 54 
dual-class firms that are part of a selection index. Panel A reports the percentage and number of firm-year 
observations where the largest shareholder holds at least 25% and 50% of the votes, respectively. Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis. The ownership variables refer to the situation 
before the dual-class unification. Panel C reports summary statistics for the firms that decide to unify and those that 
keep their dual-class structure. 
 
Panel C suggests that for firms that unify their dual-class shares the large shareholder holds fewer 
votes on average (47%) than firms that do not unify (66%). The large shareholder also holds fewer 
preference shares (2% vs. 6%) and fewer cash flow rights (28% vs. 42%). As expected, the vote 
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loss for firms that unify is lower (14% vs. 23%), the weight penalty is greater (0.76% vs. 0.29%) 
and ownership by financial investors is also greater. Finally, firms that unify are smaller in size, as 
measured by total assets, and have greater tangibility. Among those firms that unify their dual-class 
shares, 5 firms decided to unify several years after the announcement of the rules in 2004 and 2005. 
In unreported results, we find some evidence that these firms were larger, had a lower weight 
penalty and a higher vote loss. It is highly likely that these firms had fewer incentives to unify early 
because they would have suffered from a higher vote loss and would have felt less pressure to unify 
because of a comparatively lower weight penalty. 
5. Event Study  
This section explores whether there are wealth effects associated with the regulatory change. The 
reasons for doing this are twofold. First, we aim to assess whether the announcement of the new 
rules exerted pressure on dual-class firms to unify their shares. This would be the case if there is a 
positive market reaction surrounding the announcement of the new rules. Second, we aim to assess 
whether investors react positively to the announcements of actual dual-class stock unifications, 
attributing value to these unifications.  
To this effect we run two distinct event studies. The two event studies are based on market model 
regressions. The estimation window for the parameters underlying the model is the 250 trading 
days ending 21 trading days prior to the announcement. The event windows used in this paper 
include [-20, 20], [-20, 0], [-1, 1] and [0, 0]. We use the CDAX, which comprises all German 
companies listed on the Prime and General Standard segments of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, 
as a proxy for the market portfolio. Using the CDAX rather than one of the selection indices deals 
with the issue that the various selection indices may have been affected by the regulatory change 
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and/or the actual conversions. The dates for the announcements of the actual conversions are 
gathered from the website of the German Association for Ad-Hoc Announcements (“Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität” (DGAP), www.dgap.de), company websites and newspaper 
articles.  
For the event study on the regulatory changes20 (Panel A of Table 5), we use the modified version 
of Boehmer et al.’s (1991) test statistic, as proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), to assess the 
significance of the announcement returns. This test specifically adjusts for the clustering of the 
observations – the announcement date of the new rules is the same for all the firms – by accounting 
for cross-sectional correlation of the abnormal returns in the estimation window. For the event 
study on the actual conversions (Panel B of Table 5), we evaluate the significance of the 
announcement returns based on Boehmer et al.’s (1991) standardized cross-sectional t-statistic, 
which compared to the test by Patell (1976), also accounts for event-induced variance. In line with 
prior work, we separately report the announcement returns for the sample firms’ voting and non-
voting shares.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the (cumulative) average abnormal returns ((C)AARs) for all the firms 
with dual-class stocks that were included in a selection index around the time of the announcement 
of the regulatory change, i.e. August 9, 2000. The CAARs in Panel A are those for the 30 dual-
class firms with listed non-voting shares and the 15 dual-class firms with listed voting shares 
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 The announcement concerning the downsizing of the SDAX was made in August 2001, i.e. one year later than the 
regulatory changes. Hence, our event study is not contaminated by this downsizing. 
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included in the selection index.21,22 We start by analyzing the CAARs for the actually listed share 
category. There is no market reaction on the event day as evidenced by the insignificant AAR of 
0.44%. However, when the event window is extended to include the 20 days preceding the 
announcement of the change to the rules, the CAAR increases to 4.15% and becomes significant 
at the 10% level.23 When the event window is further extended to cover the 20 days following the 
announcement day, the CAAR increases to 5.35% and is significant at the 5% level. Panel A also 
suggests that the positive announcement effect is mainly due to the non-voting shares. Indeed, the 
CAAR over the entire 41-day window amounts to 5.67% and is significant at the 5% level for the 
non-voting shares compared to 3.74% and significance at the 10% level only for the voting shares.24  
                                                     
21
 This is a snapshot of all dual-class firms included in a selection index in August 2000. As a result, the sample size 
differs from the one described on p.11 that covers the whole observation period. 
22
 We decided to exclude three firms due to possible confounding events. One firm was founded in 2000 and could 
therefore not be included. Another one changed its legal status in August 2000, at the same time as the 
announcement of the regulatory change. A third firm had a stock split in July 2000. 
23
 The large event window is chosen to capture the pre-announcement effects. There is clear evidence of such pre-
announcement effects in 2000. In that year, speculations about new weighting rules arose after Stoxx Ltd. announced 
that henceforward weighting in its Euro Stoxx index would be based only on the free float of the market capitalization 
of one of its classes of shares. Though Deutsche Börse officially denied intentions to adopt similar rules for its major 
stock indices (see Süddeutsche Zeitung (July 5, 2000, p.29) and dpa-AFX (July 12, 2000)), rumors intensified in mid-
July as various newspaper articles speculated about a change in the listing rules and identified potential index winners 
and losers. See Börsen-Zeitung (July 13, 2000, p.3), Financial Times Deutschland (July 17, 2000, p.28) and Financial 
Times Deutschland (July 17, 2000, p.1). 
24
 We re-ran the event study including only non-selection index dual class firms. In the days surrounding the 
announcement of the change, we observe no significant market reactions for non-selection-index dual class firms. 
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Panel B of Table 5 reports the announcement returns around the actual conversion announcements. 
We find significantly positive announcement returns for the non-voting shares ranging from 4.7% 
on the announcement date to 8.6% over the [-20, 0] window. Previous work on Germany by 
Dittmann and Ulbricht (2008) also documents sizeable wealth effects generated by the conversion 
of non-voting shares. They justify the observed increases in shareholder value by the improved 
corporate governance and enhanced liquidity of the stock. We do not observe consistently 
significant abnormal returns for the voting shares, whatever the event window. However, given 
that we observe a significantly positive market reaction for the case of the voting shares for some 
event windows in Panel A suggests that the jury is still out there as to the benefits of dual-class 
unifications for the holders of voting shares. 
Table 5: Event study results 
Panel A. Cumulative average abnormal returns at the announcement of the regulatory change in August 2000 
CAARs for the actually listed share category 
Event window CAAR Positive : Negative Adj. BMP t-statistic 
[-20, 20] 5.35% 29 : 16 1.997** 
[-20, 0] 4.15% 29 : 16 1.671* 
[-1, 1] 1.06% 26 : 19 1.188 
[0, 0] 0.44% 25 : 20 0.931 
    
CAARs for non-voting shares 
Event window CAAR Positive : Negative Adj. BMP t-statistic 
[-20, 20] 5.67% 29 : 12 2.284** 
[-20, 0] 4.50% 27 : 14 1.975** 
[-1, 1] 0.87% 23 : 18 0.866 
[0, 0] 0.62% 26 : 15 1.223 
    
CAARs for voting shares 
Event window CAAR Positive : Negative Adj. BMP t-statistic 
[-20, 20] 3.74% 18 : 14 1.701* 
[-20, 0] 3.37% 21 : 11 1.640* 
[-1, 1] 1.28% 19 : 13 1.635 
[0, 0] 0.14% 18 : 14 0.321 
    
Panel B. Cumulative average abnormal returns at the announcement of a stock unification between 2000 and 
2008 
                                                     
Since only selection-index dual class firms have been affected by the regulatory change, the market does not expect 
non-selection index dual class firms to convert their shares. 
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CAARs for non-voting shares 
Event window CAAR Positive : Negative BMP t-statistic 
[-20, 20] 7.35% 13 : 4 3.126*** 
[-20, 0] 8.61% 13 : 4 3.952*** 
[-1, 1] 5.29% 12 : 5 2.770*** 
[0, 0] 4.66% 12 : 5 2.127** 
    
CAARs for voting shares 
Event window CAAR Positive : Negative BMP t-statistic 
[-20, 20] 0.47% 7 : 10 0.346 
[-20, 0] 2.69% 9 : 8 0.757 
[-1, 1] 1.88% 10 : 7 1.016 
[0, 0] 1.04% 8 : 9 0.264 
 
Notes: Table 5 presents cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around the announcement day for actual stock 
unifications as well as around the announcement day of the change in rules. CAARs are reported for four distinct event 
windows: [-20, 20], [-20, 0], [-1, 1] and [0, 0]. Panel A presents CAARs around the announcement of the regulatory 
change. The t-statistic is the modified version of Boehmer et al.’s test proposed by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) (Adj. 
BMP t-statistic). Note that not each stock class is traded. Hence, when we extend the analysis to both classes of dual-
class firms, the number of observations for non-voting and voting shares is different. Panel B reports the CAARs for 
stock unifications between 2000 and 2008. The relevant test statistic is the one proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) 
(BMP t-statistic). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
To conclude, two important findings emerge from this section. First, the market responds positively 
to the regulatory change announced by Deutsche Börse. In the days surrounding the announcement 
of the change, we observe significantly positive market reactions for our sample firms. We interpret 
this as a sign that the market perceives that the regulatory change increases the likelihood of firms 
converting their shares and that in turn this puts firms under pressure to consider unification. 
Second and in line with previous work, we find significantly positive market reactions around 
actual stock unifications.  
6. Motives for the Unification of Dual-Class Shares  
This section develops a set of hypotheses on the motives for the unification of dual-class shares. 
The new index weighting rules for the German selection indices, which were announced by 
Deutsche Börse in August 2000 and became effective in June 2002, forced firms and their large 
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shareholders alike to reassess the benefits from their dual-class structure by weighing them against 
the foregone index weight associated with having dual-class stock. This leads us to our first 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (Weight Penalty): The higher the hypothetical weight penalty upon conversion, the 
more likely a firm will abolish its dual-class share structure. 
As evidenced in Section 5 by the positive announcement effect, the unification of dual-class stock 
will likely increase firm value. This suggests that shareholders of German firms prefer single-class 
stock over dual-class stock. However, self-interested, large shareholders of dual-class firms may 
enforce the status quo at the expense of the minority shareholders in order to safeguard their private 
benefits of control. The theoretical literature (see e.g., Grossman and Hart 1988) as well as the 
empirical literature (see e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2008) suggest that the expropriation of minority 
shareholders is more likely for firms with a large shareholder that holds more voting rights than 
cash flow rights. The dual-class structure allows the large shareholder to retain a substantial impact 
on the firm without having to own the equivalent stake in cash-flow rights. The unification of the 
voting and non-voting shares would then typically cause the large shareholder to experience a 
substantial loss of voting power. This discussion leads us to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 (Voting Loss): The larger the loss of voting power suffered by the large shareholder 
the greater is the loss of private benefits of control and hence the lower is the likelihood of a dual-
class unification. 
7. Empirical Analysis 
To test our hypotheses about firms reassessing the costs and benefits of having more than one class 
of shares, we run a series of pooled cross-sectional logistic regressions: 
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where y  is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the company unifies its share classes, and 0 
otherwise. Our variables of interest are x1, the “Voting Loss” and x2, the “Weight Penalty”. “Voting 
Loss” refers to the hypothetical loss of the controlling shareholder’s voting power if the non-voting 
shares were converted into voting shares and “Weight Penalty” is the reduction in index weight 
that is associated with retaining a dual-class structure. The vector X
 
contains the constant term and 
further explanatory variables.  
We use five different variations or specifications of the above equation. Specification (1) is the 
base specification as above. In addition, specification (2) includes the interaction between “Voting 
Loss” and “Weight Penalty”. Financial investors, i.e. banks and insurance companies, may have 
fewer incentives to extract private benefits of control and hence may increase the likelihood of 
unification (Maury and Pajuste 2011). Therefore, specification (3) also includes the Financial 
Investor dummy variable (see below for further details). As to the weight penalty, a special case 
arises when firms are in danger of dropping out of their index. In this case, a conversion might 
enable the firm to retain its index membership. Further, the heaviest-weighted firms within an index 
may move up one index by converting their shares. Specifications (4) and (5) thus include two 
further dummy variables, “Danger” and “Chance”, characterizing a firm’s relative position in its 
index. While “Danger” indicates cases where a firm is in danger of dropping from its current index 
due to its low relative rank, “Chance” indicates situations where a firm is at the high end of the 
index and thus has a chance to move up to the next highest index. 25  
                                                     
25
 The findings must be considered with the caveat that relatively few observations in our sample qualify as being in 
danger of dropping out of or having the chance to move up an index: 10 firms are in danger of dropping out of their 
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Moving onto the control variables, Maury and Pajuste (2011) argue that, because dual-class shares 
typically trade at a discount and thereby increase the cost of raising equity (Dyck and Zingales 
2004), a larger need for external capital is an important factor in explaining the decision of firms 
to abolish their dual-class structure. Firms with more tangible assets may be able to attract more 
external financing as tangible assets are easier to value, and hence ideal collateral reducing the 
expected costs of financial distress (Almeida and Campello 2007). Therefore, we add the tangibility 
of assets to proxy for the fact that firms with a high tangibility are less dependent on the equity 
market and hence are less likely to unify their shares. We also add firm size to all five 
specifications, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Table 6 presents the regression 
results. 
Table 6: Logit estimates 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vote Loss -0.005 
[-3.95***] 
-0.006 
[-4.12***] 
-0.006 
[-3.92***] 
-0.006 
[-3.80***] 
-0.006 
[-3.62***] 
Weight Penalty 0.050 
[2.57***] 
0.066 
[2.99**] 
0.069 
[3.29***] 
0.073 
[3.47***] 
0.071 
[3.32***] 
Firm size -0.025 
[-3.09***] 
-0.025 
[-3.04***] 
-0.026 
[-3.20***] 
-0.029 
[-3.42***] 
-0.030 
[-3.50***] 
Tangibility -0.201 
[-2.31**] 
-0.208 
[-2.50**] 
-0.228 
[-2.93***] 
-0.210 
[-2.60***] 
-0.207 
[-2.75***] 
Financial Investor   0.057 
[1.95*] 
0.039 
[1.11] 
0.040 
[1.12] 
Danger    0.100 
[2.96***] 
0.102 
[3.05***] 
Chance     0.034 
[0.30] 
      
Vote Loss*Weight Penalty  -0.006 
[-1.70*] 
-0.006 
[-1.75*] 
-0.006 
[-1.65*] 
-0.006 
[-1.58] 
      
Pseudo R2 0.1931 0.2009 0.2078 0.2435 0.2448 
 
Notes: Table 6 presents the results on the determinants of the probability to adopt a single-class share 
structure. We estimate the relationship for firms that are in a selection index. The sample comprises 229 firm-
year observations with 54 dual-class firms of which 19 firms decide to unify over the period 2000-2008. 
                                                     
index (this amounts to 7.4% or 17 firm-year observations of the sample) and 4 firms have the chance to move up (this 
amounts to 2.6% or 6 firm-year observations of the sample). 
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Firms are excluded from the sample after unification. The regressors are lagged by one period. We report 
average marginal effects (AME). The interaction effect Vote Loss*Weight Penalty is defined as the change 
in the predicted probability of unification for a change in both the loss of voting rights and the foregone index 
weight. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1.  Z-statistics are based on cluster-robust 
standard errors and appear in brackets below the slope estimates. ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
The findings suggest that the reduction in index weight associated with retaining the dual-class 
structure is indeed a determinant of the firm’s decision to convert its shares. “Weight penalty” is 
positive and highly significant in all five specifications. This evidence is highly supportive of our 
main hypothesis, Hypothesis 1.26 
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 It would be desirable to control for firm fixed effects in our framework. Unfortunately, this is not feasible due to 
several reasons. Simply including firm fixed effects in the estimation equation would lead to inconsistent and biased 
unconditional maximum likelihood estimates of not only the fixed effects but also of the common parameters (so-
called incidental parameter problem). For a fixed number of time periods (T), the estimators of the fixed effects will 
be inconsistent if the number of firms increases. Due to the fact that the estimators of the common parameters depend 
on the estimates of the fixed effects, the inconsistency directly translates into the estimates of the common parameters. 
Furthermore, e.g., Greene (2004) documents substantial biases in the parameter estimates if the number of time periods 
is small. For T=2, analytical evidence shows that the bias amounts to 100 percent. The size of the bias decreases by 
increasing the number of time periods, but still amounts to roughly 20 percent for T=8 in Greene's simulations. As 
pointed out by Dittmann and Ulbricht (2008), an extension of the periods of study would not solve the problem as 
firms will drop out of the sample after unification.  Alternatively, conditioning out firm fixed effects by using a 
conditional logit approach would also cause severe problems as firms without variation in the dependent variable are 
excluded. This would lead to a significantly reduced number of observations. Another potential way forward would be 
to employ the Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980) device. This would involve modeling individual heterogeneity 
by means of the time-varying independent variables which would be included as additional variables on the right hand 
side of each equation. Given the relatively small number of conversions, we refrain from using this approach, as it 
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Further, the loss of voting power incurred by the ultimate controlling shareholder has a significantly 
negative impact on the likelihood to convert. The effect is significant at the 1% level in all five 
specifications, providing strong support for Hypothesis 2. This suggests that the large shareholder 
is less likely to agree to convert his firm’s non-voting shares if he has more private benefits to lose.  
Further, the effect of asset tangibility is significant, at the 5% level or better, suggesting that less 
equity dependence decreases the likelihood of the firm converting its non-voting stock. Hence, 
similar to prior studies (see Maury and Pajuste 2011 and Dittmann and Ulbricht 2008), we find that 
the large shareholder’s desire to safeguard his private benefits of control and equity dependence in 
terms of financing are important explanatory variables of the decision to convert. In addition, we 
document that firms with large financial investors are more likely to unify their shares (significant 
at the 10% level in specification (3)).27 This finding is in line with Maury and Pajuste (2011). 
“Danger” is significant at the 1% level, indicating that a conversion is a measure of last resort to 
safeguard index membership for firms in danger of dropping out. On the contrary, we find no 
evidence that the chance to move up one index has a significant impact on the likelihood of 
conversion. These results are in line with anecdotal evidence, which suggests that a drop in the 
relative position within the index as well as the exclusion from the index are major concerns for 
companies whereas moving up one index is not a matter for consideration. 
                                                     
would lead to an increased number of parameters which would have to be estimated. As there is relatively little 
variation in some of the independent variables, this approach might cause additional problems. 
 
27
 In unreported regressions, we also test for the impact of institutional investors (such as hedge funds, private equity 
funds etc.) but do not find a significant impact on the probability to unify. In addition, we test for the effect of 
belonging to a more prestigious selection index but we fail to find evidence of such an effect. 
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So far, our analysis has shown that the foregone gain in index weight has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of a conversion whereas the voting loss for the large shareholder has a negative impact 
on that likelihood. We now turn our attention to the trade-off the large shareholder faces between 
the main benefit from converting the non-voting shares, i.e. maintaining the firm’s position within 
the index, and keeping voting power.  
Our specifications (2) to (5) include the interaction between "Vote Loss" and "Weight Penalty". 
Further details are provided in the Appendix. The interaction effect is negative and significant at 
the 10% level in three of the four specifications that include the term, i.e. specifications (2), (3) and 
(4). Taking into account the small sample size, a significance at the level of 10% seems to be 
relatively high.28  
We illustrate the trade-off between converting the non-voting shares to maintain or strengthen the 
index weight and keeping voting power by using a plot of predicted conditional probabilities of 
conversion for different levels of voting loss. We distinguish between high, intermediate and low 
levels of weight penalty (see Figure 1). High levels of weight penalty are defined as those in the 
75% percentile, intermediate ones as those in the 50% percentile and low ones as those in the 25% 
percentile. The difference between the probabilities of conversion for firms with a high weight 
penalty and those with a low weight penalty is positive, i.e., the marginal effect of the weight 
penalty is positive. However, this difference decreases as the vote loss increases, reflecting the 
negative interaction effect. Hence, the impact of the weight penalty on the probability of conversion 
becomes smaller as the loss of voting rights becomes greater. 
  
                                                     
28
 Additionally, McClelland and Judd (1993), among others, point out that interactions tend to be difficult to find in 
non-experimental data and that the power to detect these effects is usually lower than detecting main effects. This leads 
us to accept a significance level of 10%. 
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Figure 1 – Conditional predicted probabilities of conversion based on different 
hypothetical weight penalties 
 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the decrease in the probability of conversion, based on 
different hypothetical weight penalties (75% quantile, 50% quantile and 25% quantile), 
brought about by different levels of vote loss (x-axis). 
Figure 1 suggests that the larger the voting loss of the controlling shareholder the greater are his 
private benefits of control and the less he is concerned about the costs from the reduction in the 
firm’s index weight. In contrast, controlling shareholders who experience only a small loss of 
voting power are more likely to convert than to forfeit index weight.  
Another way of interpreting the differences between the curves is that they represent the large 
shareholder’s sensitivity towards loss of index weight: Figure 1 then indicates that this sensitivity 
decreases with increasing voting loss. Put differently, if the large shareholder loses a substantial 
fraction of the votes (bottom right corner of the graph), he does not care much about the index 
weight gain from conversion. Conversion is just too costly in terms of the private benefits that are 
foregone. Bearing in mind the difference in slopes between the three curves, for firms whose index 
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weight penalty is more pronounced the probability of conversion decreases faster with increases in 
the percentage of voting loss by the large shareholder compared to firms with a comparatively 
small weight penalty. This pattern is in line with what one expects in the presence of a trade-off 
faced by the large shareholder between diluting voting power and tolerating a reduction in index 
weight.  
Figure 2 complements Figure 1. Whereas Figure 1 depicts the probability of conversion relative to 
different levels of vote loss (x-axis), Figure 2 shows the probability of conversion relative to 
different levels of weight penalty. The three curves in Figure 2 refer to the 25% quantile, the 50% 
quantile and the 75% quantile, respectively.  
The difference between the probabilities of conversion for firms with a low and high vote loss is 
negative, i.e., the marginal effect of vote loss is negative. Contrary to Figure 1 the curve 
representing the 75% quantile (of the vote loss) is now the lowest, rather than the highest, of all 
three curves. The difference between the curves further increases if we increase the weight penalty. 
This is the case because the probability of conversion increases faster for firms with a small vote 
loss as the weight penalty increases compared to firms with a high vote loss, i.e., each increase in 
the index weight penalty has less of an impact the higher the vote loss that accompanies the weight 
penalty. Put differently, the percentage of votes that are lost by converting does not make a 
difference if the foregone index weight caused by the status quo is small – the controlling 
shareholder is then extremely reluctant to unify. However, if the foregone index weight is large, 
the large shareholder’s decision to convert will depend strongly on how many votes are lost in case 
of conversion. 
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Figure 2 – Conditional predicted probabilities of conversion based on different 
levels of vote loss 
 
Notes: This figure depicts the decrease in the probability of conversion, based on 
different levels of vote loss (75% quantile, 50% quantile and 25% quantile), brought 
about by different levels of weight penalty (x-axis). 
 
 
In summary, we document that the index weight significantly affects the controlling shareholder’s 
motivation to unify the non-voting and voting stock. However, this motivation also depends on the 
level of vote loss the controlling shareholder would experience if he agreed to a stock unification. 
8. Conclusion 
During summer 2000, Deutsche Börse changed the rules on how firms are selected for membership 
of its selection indices. First, only the most liquid or largest share class now forms the basis for 
selection into an index. Second, only the free float of that class is taken into account when 
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determining index membership. As a consequence of the new rules firms with dual-class stock 
faced the danger of losing large amounts of index weight. Within this context, this study examines 
the probability of dual-class stock unifications. There is evidence that firms were under pressure to 
unify their dual-class stock. Indeed, both the announcements of actual unifications as well as the 
announcement of the new rules generated significant positive abnormal returns. 
We find that both the desire to safeguard or strengthen index weight and the danger of losing index 
membership have a significant impact on the probability of a dual-class stock unification. Similar 
to studies on dual-class stock unifications before the change in rules, we observe that firms are less 
likely to abolish their dual-class shares if they are less reliant on equity financing. We also find that 
the existence of private benefits of control makes it less likely for firms to unify their shares.  
More importantly, our findings suggest that the large shareholder faces a trade-off between 
safeguarding the existing private benefits of control and the costs associated with an index weight 
loss when deciding on a conversion. The greater the private benefits, the less likely there will be a 
conversion. In other words, forfeiting index weight may be the lesser of two evils if the alternative 
is losing voting power.  
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Appendix 
 
The interaction between "Vote Loss" and "Weight Penalty" is equal to: 
�ሺݔ�ሻ = �ሺݕ = ͳ |ݔሻ = exp ሺ�ଵݔଵ + �ଶݔଶ+�ଵଶݔଵݔଶ + ��ሻͳ + exp ሺ�ଵݔଵ + �ଶݔଶ+�ଵଶݔଵݔଶ + ��ሻ  
The inclusion of this interaction allows us to explore whether the effect of the weight penalty varies 
in line with the vote loss (and vice versa). Since the interaction effect in non-linear models cannot 
be easily evaluated on the basis of the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient 
on the interaction term, we take the cross-partial derivative of the expected probability of 
conversion (Norton et al., 2004):  � �ሺݕ = ͳ |ݔሻ� ݔଵ � ݔଶ = �ଵଶ ቀ�ሺݔ�ሻ ∗ (ͳ − �ሺݔ�ሻ)ቁ+ ሺ�ଵ + �ଵଶݔଶሻሺ�ଶ + �ଵଶݔଵሻሺ�ሺݔ�ሻሺͳ − �ሺݔ�ሻሻሺͳ − ʹ�ሺݔ�ሻሻሻ 
The statistical significance is also based on the entire cross derivative. 
 
